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Abstract
Supply Chain Formation (SCF) is the process of determining the participants
in a supply chain, who will exchange what with whom, and the terms of the
exchanges. Decentralized SCF appears as a highly intricate task because
agents only possess local information, have limited knowledge about the ca-
pabilities of other agents, and prefer to preserve privacy. Very recently, the
decentralized SCF problem has been cast as an optimization problem that
can be efficiently approximated using max-sum loopy belief propagation. Un-
fortunately, the memory and communication requirements of this approach
largely hinder its scalability. This paper presents a novel encoding of the
problem into a binary factor graph (containing only binary variables) along
with an alternative algorithm. These allow to scale up to form supply chains
in markets with higher degrees of competition.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the current industrial global setting, enterprises are facing an era of changing pro-
duction paradigms. Instead of taking care of the whole production process, from raw
materials to final consumer-ready product, companies rely more and more on outsourcing
both the components and the processes needed to obtain the desired goods. That, paired
with the fact that transportation costs are decreasing while delivery times grow shorter,
is leading to the creation of the so called extended enterprise: the dynamic network of
interconnected organizations, from suppliers’ suppliers to customers’ customers, which
work collaboratively to bring value to the marketplace [10]. Conversely, companies face
a market in constant change where being able to manage uncertainty has become a key
factor for enterprises efficiency.
There is plenty of evidence of businesses shifting their production models towards this
new paradigm. Large traditional manufacturing companies are increasingly outsourcing
their production. Software companies forward part of their work to subcontracted com-
panies in India. Start-ups form temporal coalitions that allow them to compete with
larger companies. In all these processes it is of critical importance to be able to choose
the right partners among those available in the market.
1.1 The supply chain formation problem
The above described scenario can be studied in the guise of supply chains (SC). In [13],
Walsh and Wellman define a supply chain as a network of production and exchange
relationships that spans multiple levels of production or task decomposition. The most
basic supply chain is that in which a supplier provides a consumer with a single unit
of a single good. According to [13], “Supply chain formation (SCF) is the process of
determining the participants in the supply chain, who will exchange what with whom,
and the terms of the exchanges.”
Today’s market is in constant change. Producers are faced with ever-changing cus-
tomer needs and resources costs and availability. Consequently it is no longer possible to
maintain supply chains over extended periods of time. Thus, the ability to quickly form
effective, mutually beneficial trading partnerships becomes increasingly important. This
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is, today’s companies are in need for support to swiftly create business collaborations
that allow them to readily respond to changing market needs.
The old approach for supply chain formation, where supply chain were assessed
manually after extended negotiations is no longer viable. Moreover, human irrationality
coupled with the complexity of the problem often lead to inefficient supply chains. These
problems can be avoided by the use of computational techniques to automate SCF.
Indeed, such techniques have been proved useful in real-world scenarios saving over $5
billion to businesses by means of combinatorial auctions [11].
1.2 Current approaches to automated SCF
The SCF problem has been widely tackled by the multi-agent systems literature [2, 3, 7,
8, 13, 14, 16]. Self-interested rational agents are specifically well suited for the SCF. This
kind of agents can act in behalf of companies, deliberating among themselves. After the
deliberation process is over, agents assess the new supply chain in a fraction of the time
required by the manual approach.
Agent-based approaches to SCF can be either centralized or decentralized. On the
one hand, centralized approaches usually employ combinatorial auctions. This approach
needs that the central entity has complete knowledge of agents bids. By doing so, it is
mandatory that all agents taking part in the process fully trust the central entity. It
is worth noting that, if the central entity was to be compromised, all the information
about all the agent would be at risk as well. Due to its centralized nature, combinatorial
auctions, can also show scalability issues. On the other hand, agents in decentralized ap-
proaches only have local knowledge. Moreover, by being decentralized, these approaches
are more resilient to scalability issues. Finally, decentralized multi-agent approaches are
specially fitted to the SCF problem where information, decision making and control are
inherently decentralized.
To overcome centralized approaches limitations, Walsh et al. [13] propose to solve
the SCF problem in a fully decentralised manner. More recently, Whinsper et al. [16]
have cast the decentralized SCF problem as an optimization problem that can be approx-
imated using max-sum loopy belief propagation (henceforth max-sum). We shall refer
to Whinsper’s approach as lbp. Interestingly, lbp produces more efficient supply chains
than [13]. Unfortunately, the memory and communication requirements of this approach
largely hinder its scalability. Furthermore, the larger the number of participants, the
further the supply chain (SC) assessed by lbp is from the optimal one.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis we propose a novel approach to the decentralised SCF problem, the so-called
Reduced Binary Loopy Belief Propagation (rb-lbp), that significantly outperforms lbp
in terms of scalability. The main contributions of rb-lbp are: (i) a novel encoding of
the SCF problem into a binary factor graph (containing only binary variables); (ii) the
9
derivation of simplified messages that dramatically lowers the communication require-
ments of message passing; and (iii) a strategy to increase the value of the resulting supply
chain by avoiding stagnation when equally-valued supply chain alternatives are found.
We show that in the worst case memory and communication requirements of rb-lbp
scale linearly, whereas lbp scales exponentially. Furthermore, we empirically compare
rb-lbp versus lbp. We observe that as degrees of competition in the market increase:
(i) rb-lbp can save several orders of magnitude in terms of memory and communication
with respect to lbp; (ii) rb-lbp is up to 20 times faster than lbp; (iii) the value of the
supply chains obtained by rb-lbp can be up to 2 times higher than those obtained by
lbp.
1.4 Thesis organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces in more detail
the state of the art methods for SCF, both centralized and decentralized approaches
and offers an analysis of memory and communication requirements for lbp. Chapter 3
thoroughly describes rb-lbp, our main contribution. Chapter 4 details the results after
comparing lbp with rb-lbp. Finally, chapter 5 draws conclusions and sets paths for
future research.
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Chapter 2
Related work
This chapter presents the state of the art methods for automated SCF. First, in sec-
tion 2.1, we introduce concepts that will be of use in the rest of the document. Next,
in section 2.2, we introduce methods based on the centralized approach. After that,
in section 2.3, we focus on the decentralized approach where we devote specific atten-
tion to Loopy Belief Propagation (lbp) [16], for which a detailed complexity analysis is
conducted. Finally we summarize the different approaches in section 2.4.
2.1 Mechanism design concepts
In this section we introduce few concepts of mechanism design. By doing so we are
establishing a metric with which describe how different mechanisms behave. Later on, we
will use these metrics to compare the different mechanisms described in this document.
A mechanism is said to be individually rational if agents get a non-negative utility
by participating. A mechanism is incentive compatible if agents can’t benefit from
reporting untruthfully their utilities. That is, the best strategy for all agents in the
system is to truthfully report their private utilities. A mechanism that is budget bal-
anced is that in which no payments are made to or from the mechanism. A mechanism
is efficient if it selects the choice that maximizes the sum of agents’ utilities.
2.2 Centralized supply chain formation
Several contributions employ a mediator to solve the SCF problem by means of combina-
torial auctions [14, 3, 2]. Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) [4] are a negotiation mechanism
well suited to deal with complementarities among the goods at trade. Since production
technologies often have to deal with strong complementarities, SCF automation appears
as a very promising application area for CAs.
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2.2.1 Task Dependency Networks
In order to automate SCF, Walsh and Wellman introduce the notion of Task Depen-
dency Network (TDN) [14] as a way of capturing complementarities among production
processes. A TDN takes the form of a bipartite directed acyclic graph. Figure 2.1 de-
picts an example of a TDN. Producers and consumers are represented by rectangles,
goods are represented by circles, and links between rectangles represent potential flows
of goods. Producers “gin supplier”, “lemon supplier” and “gin and lemon supplier” do
not require any input goods to produce one unit of gin, one unit of lemon and one unit
of each good respectively. Furthermore, producers “cocktail producer 1” and “cocktail
producer 2” require one unit of gin and one unit of lemon each in order to produce one
unit of cocktail. Moreover, the good “cocktail” can be consumed by the consumer “cock-
tail consumer”. The number below a producer stands for the selling price of his service,
whereas the number below a consumer stands for the purchasing price he is willing to
pay. Note that both selling and purchasing prices may include a fixed amount private to
the agent holding the value. By doing so, agents can participate in the market without
revealing their true valuations.
gin supplier
gin and lemon 
supplier
lemon supplier
cocktail 
producer 1
cocktail 
consumer
gin
cocktail
7
3
5
6
5
15lemon cocktail producer 2
Figure 2.1: Task dependency network for the production of a cocktail.
The TDN in figure 2.1 allows several feasible supply chain configurations. For in-
stance, the configuration SC1: “gin and lemon supplier” → “cocktail producer 1” →
“cocktail consumer” (“gin and lemon supplier” produces lemon and gin for “cocktail
producer 1”, who takes it as an input to produce a cocktail for “cocktail consumer”)
is feasible, whereas SC2: “gin supplier” → “cocktail producer 2” is not feasible since
“cocktail producer 2” is not receiving the lemon needed to produce a cocktail for “cock-
tail consumer”. The value of a configuration is assessed by subtracting its producers’
values from its consumers’ values. For instance, the value of SC1 is 15 − 5 − 7 = 3. In
general, the value of a supply chain configuration SC is:∑
ci∈SC
v(ci)−
∑
pj∈SC
v(pj). (2.1)
where v(pj) and v(ci) stand for ther j-th producer and i-th consumer values respectively.
The SCF problem is that of finding the feasible configuration with maximum value.
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In [14], Walsh and Wellman propose to solve the SCF problem by means of one-shot
combinatorial auctions. After receiving bids from agents reporting costs and values,
the auction, computes an allocation that maximizes the supply chain value and informs
the agents of the results. The CA ensures that no agent has negative utility ensuring
individual rationality. However, specific strategic bidding behaviours (no incentive com-
patibility) and the way payments are made may prevent the supply chain from forming
at all, resulting in a supply chain value of zero [14]. When agents bid truthfully, CA find
efficient solutions. Payments, as described by Walsh and Wellman in [14], do not imply
net transfer to or from the mechanism. Therefore, this mechanism is budget balanced.
2.2.2 Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Although very important for SCF, TDNs present lack expressivity to represent some
real-world problems such as transformations with more than one kind of output, trans-
formations with several units of a kind of good, cyclic transformations (that is, transfor-
mations that produce a good that is input for an earlier transformation in the SC) among
others. Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs), where introduced in [2]
as a generalisation of the standard model of CAs. Rather than negotiating over goods,
in MMUCAs the auctioneer and the bidders can negotiate over transformations, each
one characterised by a set of input goods and a set of output goods. A bidder offering
a transformation is willing to produce its output goods after having received its input
goods along with the payment specified in the bid.
While in standard CAs, a solution to the Winner Determination Problem (WDP) is
a set of atomic bids to accept, in MMUCAs, the order in which the auctioneer “uses” the
accepted transformations matters. Thus, a solution to the WDP is a sequence of trans-
formations. Solutions assessed by MMUCA are always efficient and respect individual
rationality. Incentive compatibility can be achieved by means of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
pricing [2]. In general, MMUCA mechanism is not budget balanced since payments may
take place from the mechanism to the agents to ensure incentive compatibility. Unfortu-
nately, the MMUCA WDP has been proved to be NP-complete [2]. Although reasonably
fast solvers have been introduced [7], MMUCA still turns out to be impractical in high
complexity scenarios.
Centralized approaches rely on a central authority that possesses the private valu-
ations of all agents and assesses a feasible allocation. By doing so, these approaches
need for all agents to fully trust the central authority. There are scenarios where that
assumption can not be taken so easily (e.g. temporal coalitions among companies with-
out the intervention of a third party mediator). Moreover, the existence of a centralized
entity introduces a single point of failure in the system. Finally, these methods can also
have scalability issues due to their centralized nature.
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2.3 Decentralized supply chain formation
In this section we introduce some methods that tackle the SCF problem in a decentralized
manner. Due to the decentralized nature of this methods, agents only possess local
information (i.e. information about themselves and their neighbours). By restricting
the amount of information any agent possesses the concerns about privacy are greatly
reduced. Moreover, since computation is performed in a distributed manner, this kind
of systems are expected to scale gracefully.
The majority of the methods that tackle supply chain formation in a decentralized
manner are based either on negotiation or a series of auctions. First, we introduce the
Contract Net Protocol a method based on negotiation. Second, we introduce the SAMP-
SB family of methods based on combinatorial auctions. Last, we introduce Loopy Belief
Propagation.
2.3.1 Contract net protocol
The Contract Net (CNET) protocol [5] is one such negotiation based approaches. In
CNET, agents start the negotiation process by sending a task announcement to the
other agents, thus, taking the role of manager. From then on, other agents send bids to
the manager. After a process of information request and delivery, the manager awards
a contract to the most suitable of the bidders. The awarding of a task to an agent
may result in the generation of new sub-tasks by the awarded agent. Decisions in the
CNET protocol are made greedily from the root task of the supply chain. This can
result in the protocol discarding branches of the supply chain that could contain better
allocations resulting in non-efficient solutions. Individual rationality is not guaranteed
in CNET since an agent may commit himself to provide a service for a value and don’t
be able to acquire the necessary goods for less than the price committed. Moreover,
CNET is not incentive compatible since agents can report higher utility values to obtain
higher payments. Finally, all transactions take place between agents ensuring that the
mechanism is budget balanced.
2.3.2 Simultaneous Ascending (M+1)st Price with Simple Bidding
In order to overcome the myopic behaviour of CNET, Walsh and Wellman introduced
their family of Simultaneous Ascending (M+1)st Price with Simple Bidding (SAMP-SB
and SAMP-SB-D) protocols. SAMP-SB* are based on the concept of TDNs introduced
earlier and consist in a series of auctions (one for each good) that run simultaneously,
asynchronously and independently, without direct coordination.
Each auction runs according to the (M+1)st prices rules [17] that, in a nutshell,
match consumers with higher purchasing prices with producers with lower selling prices
in order to maximize the value of the supply chain. When an auction receives a bid it
notifies its bidders with the new prices for the goods as well as the winners. In turn,
agents keep raising their bids whenever they are not winning some of their goods and,
given their production costs and current prices, being active will result in a non-negative
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utility for the agent. It is possible for agents to report higher utilities in order to obtain
higher payments (non incentive compatible). Moreover, no payments are made to or
from the mechanism. Therefore, the mechanism is budget balanced.
SAMP-SB-D differs from SAMP-SB in that the former has a decommitment phase
at the end of the algorithm that allows agents to avoid participating in a SC that
would result in a negative utility for the agent. In this phase any agent purchasing an
incomplete set of input goods or not winning its output good can leave the supply chain.
Therefore, SAMP-SB-D is incentive compatible whereas SAMP-SB is not.
Although SAMP-SB* algorithms obtain efficient solutions in a number of instances
it comes at the expense of communication [16]. That is, SAMP-SB* does not guar-
antee efficiency. The increase in communication is due to the fact that SAMP-SB is
re-evaluating and communicating the winners for each auction each time it receive a
new bid.
2.3.3 Belief Propagation-based approach
The work by Winsper and Chli [16] shows that the SCF problem can be cast as an
optimisation problem that can be approximated using max-sum loopy belief propagation
[6]. This approach uses a formalism inspired on TDNs [14] to represent supply chain
problems. Thus, Winsper and Chli offer the means of converting a TDN into a graphical
model, and concretely into a factor graph, on which max-sum can operate. Consider the
TDN in figure 2.2 depicting a scenario where producers p1, p2 and p3 can produce the
good g1 requested by p4 in order to provide c1, c2 or c3 with their requested good g2.
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p1
p2
p3
p4
c1
c2
c3
g1 g2
Figure 2.2: Example of task dependency network.
The steps to follow in order to convert the TDN in figure 2.2 into a factor graph into
the factor graph depicted in figure 2.3 are as follow. Firstly, in the factor graph there
is a dashed box per agent in the TDN and the goods do not appear. Inside the agent’s
box there is a variable, represented by a circle. For instance, the box for p1 contains
variable xp1 . The values (states) of each variable encode the individual decisions that the
agent needs to make regarding his exchange relationships. For instance, table 2.1 lists
the states of the variables corresponding to agents p1, p4 and c1. Notice that the states
of p4 encode all possible exchange relationships for the agent. All agent variables also
include an inactive state: the agent does not acquire or produce any goods. Secondly,
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fp1p4fp1
fp2
fp3
fp2p4
fp3p4
fp4c1
fp4c2
fp4c3
fc1
fc2
fc3
xc1
xc2
xc3
xp4
xp1
xp2
xp3 fp4
Figure 2.3: Supply chain as a factor graph.
xp1 [fp1 ] xp4 [fp4 ] xc1 [fc1 ]
sell to p4 [-5] buy from p1, sell to c1 [-10] buy from p4 [20]
don’t sell [0] buy from p1, sell to c2 [-10] don’t buy [0]
buy from p1, sell to c3 [-10]
buy from p2, sell to c1 [-10]
buy from p2, sell to c2 [-10]
buy from p2, sell to c3 [-10]
buy from p3, sell to c1 [-10]
buy from p3, sell to c2 [-10]
buy from p3, sell to c3 [-10]
don’t buy, don’t sell [0]
Table 2.1: Example of states (and values) of agent variables.
variables corresponding to potential partners in the factor graph are connected through
a compatibility factor (represented as a square). For instance, in figure 2.3, the
variables for p1 and p4 are connected by means of compatibility factor fp1p4 and the
variables for p4 and c1 are connected by fp4c1 .
Each compatibility factor encodes wether the decisions of the two agents involved
are compatible or not. Two agents decisions are incompatible whenever one of them is
willing to trade with the other, but the other does not. For instance, consider agent
variable xp4 . Its state “buy from p1, sell to c1” is compatible with xp1 ’s “sell to p4”
(p1 produces g1, p4 consumes g1). Oppositely, if p1 decides not to sell he frustrates p4
intention to collaborate with him, making both states incompatible (p1 doesn’t provide
g1 to p4!). If two states are compatible, the value of the pairwise function is zero,
otherwise is negative infinity. Thus, considering p1 and p4, fp1p4(“sell to p4”,“buy from
p1, sell to c1”) = 0 and fp1p4(“don’t sell”,“buy from p1, sell to c1”) = −∞. Note that
to determine their compatibility, both p1 and p4 need to keep a copy of compatibility
factor fp1p4 .
Besides compatibility factors, the factor graph resulting from converting a TDN also
contains activation factors, each one representing the purchasing or selling price of
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each agent. Following table 2.1, p1 assigns value -5 to state “sell to p4”, and c1 assigns
value 20 to state “buy from p4”.
To summarise, the conversion process manages to transform a TDN into an SC factor
graph with agent variables V = {x1, . . . , xN}, activation factors {f1, . . . , fN} , and a set
F of compatibility factors. Then, the SCF problem can be recast as the problem of
finding a state assignment for the agent variables in V that maximizes the following
reward function:
R(x1, . . . , xN ) =
∑
xi∈V
fi(xi) +
∑
fkl∈F
fkl(xk, xl). (2.2)
Notice that, since a state assignment for every agent variable stands for a supply chain
configuration, equation 2.2 allows to compute the value of supply chain configurations.
The optimisation of function 2.2 can be approximated by running max-sum over an
SC factor graph. lbp has supply chain participants iteratively exchange messages en-
coding their trading decisions (to buy or sell) along with their values. Message-passing
occurs in a decentralised manner and based on agents’ trading relationships: each agent
only exchanges messages with his potential partners. This process continues until all
agent variables settle on some trading decision (state). At that point, the trading deci-
sions of supply chain participants represent a solution to the SCF problem: each agent
knows whom to buy and whom to sell.
In max-sum, messages in a factor graph flow from variable to factor and factor to
variable. Max-sum assesses the message from variable x to a factor f (µ′x→f ) as follows:
µ′x→f (sx) =
∑
f ′∈N (x)\{f}
µf ′→x(sx). (2.3)
where sx stands for a state of variable x, N (x) stands for the neighbouring factors of x
and µf ′→x stands for the last message received by variable x from factor f ′. Max-sum
assesses the message from factor f to variable x (µ′f→x) as follows:
µ′f→x(sx) = maxsY
(f(s) +
∑
y∈Y
µy→f (sy)). (2.4)
where Y stands for the set of variables linked to factor f excluding x, sy is a state of
variable y, sY is the joint state including sy for all the variables in Y , and s is the joint
state composed by sx together with sY .
Every time a variable receives messages from all its neighbouring factors, it can
locally update the value of each of its states given the messages received so far:
R˜x(sx) =
∑
f∈N (x)
µf→x(sx). (2.5)
Notice that in fact equation 2.5 allows each agent to periodically obtain an ap-
proximation to the function to optimise in equation 2.2. Thus, the highest-value state
corresponds to the SC configuration with maximum value.
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Convergence of lbp occurs when all agents find that their highest-value state (the
state that maximises R˜x) is the same as in the previous iteration. Upon convergence,
lbp includes a post-processing phase that removes incompatibilities from the computed
SC configuration. This post-process is based on the removal of edges as follow. For each
agent in the network, the agent removes all edges leading to other agents which are not
listed in his final states. After that, active producers that are not able to acquire all
their input goods remove all their outgoing edges. This process repeats until no further
edges are deleted. At the conclusion of this process, agents with outgoing edges are
regarded as part of the supply chain configuration whilst agents without outgoing edges
are regarded as inactive.
In [16], Winsper and Chli report both negative utilities and suboptimal allocations,
therefore, the mechanism does not ensure individual rationality nor allocative efficiency.
Moreover, lbp is not incentive compatible since agents can report higher utilities in
order to receive higher payments. Finally, lbp is budget balanced since no payments are
made to or from the mechanism.
Complexity analysis
The approach presented above allows agents to approximately solve the SCF problem
in a decentralised manner while considering the trading relationships in the original
TDN. Nonetheless, the example in figure 2.3 make us wonder about its memory and
communication requirements. Notice that agent variable xp4 requires 3
2 + 1 states, as
shown in table 2.1, and each compatibility factor (one per neighbouring agent) requires
2 · (32 + 1) entries (the product of the number of states of the two agents). If agent
p4 had another input good provided by three other agents, xp4 would require 3
3 + 1
states (and factors with 2 · (33 + 1) entries). In general, the memory requirements of an
SC factor graph exponentially grow with the number of goods and neighbouring agents.
This memory requirements impose a serious burden on lbp. Notice that equations 2.3
and 2.4 indicate that the size of messages from agent variable to factor and from factor
to agent variable is as large as the number of states in the agent variable. For instance,
in figure 2.3, lbp would employ messages of size 32 + 1 from agent variable xp4 to its
compatibility factors.
From this discussion follows that in markets with high degrees of competition (where
goods are either produced or consumed by a wealth of agents, or both), the SC factor
graph resulting from converting a TDN is highly demanding in terms of memory and
communication requirements. Next, we assess some upper bounds on the amount of
memory required by an SC factor graph along with the overall bandwith required by
lbp at each iteration. We assume that there are n agents, the maximum number of
goods that each agent is connected to (be it either as a producer or consumer) is G, and
the maximum number of agents connected to a single good is A. Hence, an agent has
at most G ·A potential partners. Therefore, the requirements are:
• Memory. Each compatibility factor requires A2G entries to store compatibility
values. Since each agent shares compatibility factors with G · A neighbours, the
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memory each agent requires is O(G ·A2G+1).
• Communication. The messages between an agent variable and its compatibility
factor are of size O(AG). Since each agent shares compatibility factors with G ·A
neighbours, he consumes O(G·AG+1) bandwith. Finally, since we consider n agents
in the supply chain, lbp will require O(n ·G ·AG+1) bandwith overall per iteration.
• Computation time. At each iteration, each agent needs to assess O(G · A)
messages and, by looking at the equations of the messages, we see that each message
takes at most O(A2G) operations. Thus, the total computation time required by
lbp agents is in O(G ·A2G+1).
Therefore, the exponentiality of resource requirements of the approach in [16], par-
ticularly in markets with high degrees of competition, is expected to significantly hinder
scalability.
Furthermore, lbp suffers from stagnation when equally-valued supply chain alter-
natives are found. Consider again the example in figure 2.3. Since p1 and p3 have the
same production values, in fact there are two supply chain configurations with minimum
value: one starting with p1 and another one starting with p3. In general, lbp may lapse
into stagnation when it comes across equally-valued solutions, jumping from one solution
to the other without progressing ahead towards better solutions. Hence, equally-valued
supply chain configurations (ties) lower the solution quality of the resulting SC.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter we have introduced the state of the art methods for automated SCF.
Moreover, we have pointed out problems related to scalability and privacy inherent to
centralized approaches. Furthermore, we have introduced several decentralized methods
for SCF paying special attention to lbp and pointed out their shortcomings. Finally,
table 2.2 summarizes the game theoretical properties of the methods described in this
chapter. In the next chapter we will introduce rb-lbp, our decentralized approach to
SCF, designed specifically to economize resources.
Individual Incentive Budget
rationality compatibility balance Efficient
Walsh CAs yes no yes yes (if truthful bidding)
MMUCA yes yes (if VCG) no yes
Contract Net no no yes no
SAMP-SB no no yes no
SAMP-SB-D yes no yes no
LBP no no yes no
Table 2.2: Game theoretic properties automated SCF methods.
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Chapter 3
A novel approach for SCF
through binarized belief
propagation
In the previous chapter we argued that in markets with high competition, the mapping
to a factor graph provided by Winsper and Chli in [16] requires an overlarge amount
of memory to represent variable states and factor values. In this chapter we develop
rb-lbp, an alternative algorithm that scales up to high competition markets. We start
by introducing a new mapping of a TDN into a supply chain binary factor graph
(containing only binary variables) in section 3.1. Thereafter, in section 3.2, we show
that variables, factors and messages in an SC binary factor graph take a simpler form
than their counterparts in an SC factor graph. Furthermore, in section 3.3, we describe
rb-lbp’s post-processing phase to remove incompatibilities from the computed SC con-
figuration, followed by its strategy to resolve ties, in section 3.4. Moreover, in section 3.5,
we put all these pieces together to provide a complete description of rb-lbp. We ana-
lyze its worst-case requirements in section 3.6. Finally, we analyze rb-lbp’s mechanism
design properties in section 3.7.
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Figure 3.1: Supply chain as a binary factor graph.
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3.1 From TDN to SC binary factor graph
In this section we describe how to transform a TDN into SC binary factor graph by
means of an example. In section3.1.1, we describe the general procedure to transform
any TDN into a SC binary factor graph.
We start with the TDN in figure 2.2. Figure 3.1 shows the SC binary factor graph
that results from the encoding. According to lbp, each agent is responsible for a single
state variable. Oppositely, in our encoding each agent is responsible for several decision
variables. In figure 3.1, each dashed box surrounds the variables that an agent is respon-
sible for and the factors that he needs to know about. Whenever a factor lies between
two dashed boxes, it means that both agents need to keep a copy of it.
In this new mapping, two different kind of binary decision variables are introduced:
Activation variables aα . Encodes whether agent α is active (aα = 1) or inactive
(aα = 0), namely part of the SC configuration or not.
Option variables bαgβ and sαgβ . bαgβ encodes agent’s β decision of buying good
g from agent α whereas sαgβ encodes agent’s α decision to sell good g to agent
β.
To illustrate how the mapping works, we analyze the variables that p4 is responsible
for. Likewise every agent, p4 has to decide whether to participate in the SC or not. This
decision is encoded as variable ap4 . Furthermore, as seen in figure 2.2, p4 buys good g1
and sells good g2. p4 has three choices to buy g1: he can acquire it either from p1, p2
or p3. Consequently, p4 will have variables bp1g1p4 , bp2g1p4 and bp3g1p4 encoding each of
the three possible decisions. It turns out clear that only some combinations of states are
acceptable for the four variables described. Thus, if p4 is inactive (ap4 = 0), he should
not buy g1 and so bp1g1p4 , bp2g1p4 and bp3g1p4 should all be 0. Furthermore, whenever
p4 is active, he should buy g1 from only one of his providers, that is, one and only one
out of bp1g1p4 , bp2g1p4 and bp3g1p4 should be 1. The information about whether a set of
values is acceptable is stored in factor fg1p4 . Since this factor guarantees that only one of
the providers is selected, we call it a selection factor. On the other side, p4 has three
choices to sell g2: he can sell it either to c1, c2, or c3. Thus, p4 will have variables sp4g2c1 ,
sp4g2c2 and sp4g2c3 . Notice that the acceptable combinations of values for the variables
are the same as when buying g1. Selection factors fg1p4 and fp4g2 inside p4 guarantee his
internal coherence as a decision maker.
In general, to guarantee that only one of the providers of a given good is selected,
we make use of a selection factor. A selection factor links the activation variable from
the agent (namely aβ) with the different choices for that good (namely b∗gβ). Note that
the role of aβ on a selection factor is different from that of the choices. We refer to aβ
as the activation variable of the factor and to each variable b∗gβ as option variable.
More generally, the equation for a selection factor fS joining the activation variable a
and option variables o1, . . . , on:
fS(a, o1, . . . , on) =
{
0,
∑
i oi = a
−∞, otherwise (3.1)
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Furthermore, we need to guarantee that different agents take coherent decisions. For
example, in order for p4 to effectively buy g1 from p1 (encoded in variable bp1g1p4), he
needs that p1 decides to sell g1 to him (encoded in variable sp1g1p4). Thus, we add a
factor that constrains sp1g1p4 and bp1g1p4 to be either both 1 or both 0. We call this kind
of factors equality factor. Formally, the equation for an equality factor fE joining
variables b and s:
fE(b, s) =
{
0, b = s
−∞, otherwise (3.2)
Furthermore, we need to introduce into the SC binary factor graph the information
regarding the buying and selling prices for the different agents. We do this by means of
the so called activation factors. Thus, each agent α will have a factor fα that stores:
(i) zero value whenever aα is 0; and otherwise (ii) a value equal to agent α’s buying or
selling price.
3.1.1 Conversion algorithm
After following the example, we are ready to understand the steps needed to transform
a TDN into an SC binary factor graph. The transformation process can be done in a
distributed manner, without communication between agents. Each agent α performs the
following steps:
1. Variable creation.
(a) He creates a variable aα encoding whether agent α is active or not.
(b) He creates a variable sαgβ encoding agent α’s decision to sell good g to agent
β for each good g and agent β such that agent α offers good g to agent β.
(c) He creates a variable bβgα encoding agent α’s decision to buy good g from
agent β for each good g and agent β such that agent α is offered good g by
agent β.
2. Activation factors creation. He creates an activation factor fα that stores: (i)
zero value whenever aα is 0; and otherwise (ii) a value equal to agent α’s buying
or selling price.
3. Selection factors creation.
(a) For each good g that α can buy, he creates a selection factor fgα with: (i) aα
as activation variable; and (ii) an option variable bβgα per provider β of good
g.
(b) For each each good g that α can sell, he creates a selection factor fαg with:
(i) aα as activation variable; and (ii) an option variable sαgβ for each buyer
β of good g.
4. Equality factors creation.
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(a) For each good g and each agent β such that agent α is offering good g to
agent β, he creates an equality factor linking sαgβ and bαgβ.
3.2 Simplifying message-passing
In this section we show that the memory and communication requirements for max-sum
over SC binary factor graphs can be severely reduced. First, in section 3.2.1, we show
that there is no need to store constraint factors because we can provide explicit equations
for their messages. Then, in section 3.2.2, we argue that since we employ max-sum, we
can represent any function over a binary variable using a single real number. Hence, we
derive reduced equations for the messages under this representation.
3.2.1 Compiling constraint factors into equations
Max-sum follows a sequence of message exchange steps in a factor graph. During the first
step, variables send messages to factors. During the second one, factors send messages
to variables, and this repeats until the algorithm either converges or is stopped. The
messages from a variable to a factor are given by equation 2.3 and they are a combination
of the last messages received by the variable from its neighbouring factors. The messages
from factor to variable are given by equation 2.4. Note that it does not only depend on
the last messages received by the factor from its neighbouring variables, but also on the
factor itself. We devote the rest of this section to provide the equations for the messages
passed from factors to variables.
From activation factors to activation variable. fα stores the activation cost of
an agent. Moreover, their only neighbouring variable is agent’s α activation variable.
Therefore, activation factors send a value of zero for the inactive state of α and the
activation cost v(α) for the active state. Formally,
µ′α→a(0) = 0. (3.3)
µ′α→a(1) = v(α). (3.4)
Since both equality and selection factors represent hard constraints, we can simplify
the maximum taken in the equation 2.4. For simplicity, we start with equality factors.
From equality factor to variable. Consider fE described by equation 3.2 joining
variables s and b, and that the last messages received by fE from s is µs→E . We can
readily assess the new message from fE to b (µ
′
E→b):
µ′E→b(0) = maxs
(
fE(s, 0) + µs→E(s)
)
.
Since fE(s, 0) is −∞ if s = 1, we can assure that s = 0 is the assignment that maximizes
the expression, and thus
µ′E→b(0) = fE(0, 0) + µs→E(0)
= µs→E(0).
(3.5)
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In a similar way we obtain:
µ′E→b(1) = µs→E(1). (3.6)
Note that the messages from fE to b are thus the last messages received by fE from
s. Since the equality constraint is symmetrical, the messages from fE to s are the last
messages received by fE from b.
From selection factor to activation variable. Consider a generic selection factor
fS , described by equation 3.1, joining an activation variable a with option variables
o1, . . . , on, and that the last messages received by S from a, o1, . . . , on, are respectively
µa→S , µo1→S , . . . , µon→S . We start by assessing the message from S to a, analyzing the
case when a = 0:
µ′S→a(0) = maxo1,...,on
(
fS(0, o1, . . . , on) +
∑
i
µoi→S(oi)
)
.
Since the activation variable is 0, the only possible combination of values returning a
non-infinite value for S is setting each oi to 0 and thus
µ′S→a(0) =
∑
i
µoi→S(0). (3.7)
On the other hand, the message for a = 1 is:
µ′S→a(1) = maxo1,...,on
(
fS(1, o1, . . . , on) +
∑
i
µoi→S(oi)
)
.
Since the activation variable is 1, the selection constraint is only satisfied when one of
its option variables takes on value 1 and the remaining ones take on 0. It follows that:
µ′S→a(1) = max
1≤i≤n
(
µoi→S(1) +
∑
j 6=i
µoj→S(0)
)
. (3.8)
From selection factor to option variable variable. The message sent from S to
each oi is assessed in the same way. We start with the case oi = 0. For compactness we
note o−i the set of all option variables except oi, that is {o1, . . . , oi−1, oi+1, . . . , on}.
µ′S→oi(0) = maxa,o−i
(
fS(a, oi = 0, o−i) + µa→S(a) +
∑
j 6=i
µoj→S(oj)
)
.
There are two ways in which the selection constraint can be satisfied. Either setting
every variable to 0
AllZeros = µa→S(0) +
∑
j 6=i
µoj→S(0).
or by setting a to 1 and selecting exactly one of the variables in o−i (say ok) to be 1
Select(k) = µa→S(1) + µok→S(1) +
∑
j 6=i 6=k
µoj→S(0).
26
The message sent will be the maximum among these expressions:
µ′S→oi(0) = max(AllZeros, max1≤k 6=i≤n
Select(k)). (3.9)
Finally, in case oi = 1, we have that:
µ′S→oi(1) = maxa,o−i
(
fS(a, oi = 1, o−i) + µa→S(a) +
∑
j 6=i
µoj→S(oj)
)
.
and the only way to satisfy the selection constraint is by setting a to 1 and all the
option variables in o−i to 0. Thus,
µ′S→oi(1) = µa→S(1) +
∑
j 6=i
µoj→S(0). (3.10)
Note that to assess the messages from factors to variables (using equations 3.3-3.10)
agents do not need to store the tables representing constraint factors. Since the size of
a selection factor grows exponentially with the number of options, the equations above
yield large savings in memory requirements.
3.2.2 Reducing messages
Observe that a single value δ = b(1) − b(0) is enough to represent a function b over a
binary variable. Thus, δ > 0 means x = 1 is preferred to x = 0, δ < 0 means x = 0 is
preferred to x = 1, and δ = 0 represents no preference.
The same idea can be applied to messages. Whenever rb-lbp needs to send a message
µ to or from a binary variable, instead of sending 〈µ(0), µ(1)〉, it can send a single value
ν = µ(1)−µ(0). To take full advantage of this idea, we assess the single-valued messages
that are exchanged on an SC binary factor graph.
From variable to factor. First, independently of the kind of factor, messages from
variable x to factor f contain a single value νx→f assessed as:
νx→f = µx→f (1)− µx→f (0).
and applying equation 2.3 we obtain:
ν ′x→f =
∑
f ′∈N (x)
f 6=f ′
µf ′→x(1)−
∑
f ′∈N (x)
f 6=f ′
µf ′→x(0)
=
∑
f ′∈N (x)
f 6=f ′
(
µf ′→x(1)− µf ′→x(0)
)
=
∑
f ′∈N (x)
f 6=f ′
νf ′→x.
(3.11)
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Note that the message from x to f is assessed by simply adding the last messages received
from every factor linked to x but f .
From activation factor to variable. Second, the message sent form an activation
factor fα to its activation variable a can be assessed from equations 3.3 and 3.4 as:
ν ′α→a = µα→a(1)− µα→a(0)
= v(α).
(3.12)
From equality factor to variable. Third, the message from an equality factor fE
joining variables s and b to variable b is now a single value ν ′E→b and can be assessed
from equations 3.5 and 3.6:
ν ′E→b = µE→b(1)− µE→b(0)
= µs→E(1)− µs→E(0)
= νs→E .
(3.13)
In fact, it is just the last message received by fE from variable s.
From selection factor to activation variable. Fourth, the message sent from a
selection factor S to its activation variable a can be assessed from equations 3.7 and 3.8
as:
ν ′S→a = µS→a(1)− µS→a(0)
= max
1≤i≤n
(
µoi→S(1) +
∑
j 6=i
µoj→S(0)
)−∑
i
µoi→S(0)
= max
1≤i≤n
(
µoi→S(1)− µoi→S(0))
= max
1≤i≤n
νoi→S .
(3.14)
That is, the largest message received by S from any of its option variables.
From selection factor to option variable. Fifth, by a longer derivation, the message
sent from a selection factor S to each of its option variables oi can be shown to be:
ν ′S→oi = min(νa→S , min1≤j 6=i≤n
−νoj→S). (3.15)
3.3 Determining the SC configuration
The rb-lbp algorithm distributedly runs max-sum using the above-described equations
until convergence or until reaching a maximum number of steps. After that, each agent
stores a value for each variable representing his preferences. A first solution is assessed
distributedly, each agent setting each variable to his preferred value. It is possible
that this first solution does not satisfy some of the constraints. Due to that, this first
solution needs to be revised (and possibly mended). The mending process has two main
steps: during the first one, each agent ensures that all of his internal constraints are
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satisfied; during the second one, agents ensure that providers and consumers agree on
their decision to collaborate.
Internal consistency. To guarantee internal consistency (step one), each agent checks
each of his selection constraints. When a selection constraint breaks, there are three
possible cases:
1. If the activation variable is 0, the agent sets to 0 all the option variables.
2. If the activation variable is 1 and there are no option variables set to 1, the agent
sets to 0 the activation variable
3. If the activation variable is 1 and there are two or more option variables set to 1,
the agent randomly selects one of them and sets the remaining ones to 0.
Collaboration consistency. To guarantee collaboration consistency (step two) agents
need to organize as a spanning tree to be able to act in sequence. This can be done
distributedly and efficiently [1]. After building the tree, the procedure continues as
follows. First, simultaneously, each agent sends to each of his neighbours his decision
to collaborate with him or not. Second, sequentially, each active agent will determine
(based on the information received in the previous step) whether all of their selected
partners want to collaborate with him. If that is not the case, he will set all of his
variables to 0 and send this information to his neighbours. This second step is repeated
until no agent changes his variables.
3.4 Avoiding stagnation
In section 3.3 we argued that the solution assessed when each agent independently de-
termines the values of his variables can sometimes break constraints. In many cases this
happens because there is a tie in the agent’s preferences. Consider the example in figure
2.2. There p4 has two possible providers, p1 and p3, selling good g1 at the same price.
The preferences of p4 for each of the two producers will be exactly the same, and both
variables bp1,g1,p4 and bp3,g1,p4 can be set to 1, breaking the selection constraint.
In this section we propose a simple strategy to reduce the number of ties in selection
constraints. The main idea is to establish an ordering among providers/consumers linked
by a selection constraint in case that the expected benefit of collaborating with them is
the same. For example, in the case above, before agents start exchanging messages, agent
p4 decides that he prefers to buy from p1 rather than from p3, provided that both make
the same offer. Each agent can accomplish this by assigning an economically negligible
random quantity to the value of collaborating with each of his potential partners. That
is, each agent, for each of his option variables oi, selects a small value εoi and the
messages in equations 3.14 and 3.15 are modified as follows:
ν ′S→a = max
1≤i≤n
(νoi→S + εoi). (3.16)
ν ′S→oi = εoi + min(νa→S , min1≤j 6=i≤n
−(νoj→S + εoj )). (3.17)
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rb-lbp generates each value of εoi by sampling a uniform distribution in the range
[−0.00005, 0.00005].
3.5 Reduced binary loopy belief propagation
Now we have at hand all the pieces required to provide a complete description of rb-lbp.
It is a distributed algorithm that proceeds as follows:
1. Each agent stores the variables defined at step 1 of the procedure in section 3.1.1.
2. Each agent randomly assigns a weight εoi to each of his variables, except the
activation variable, as described in section 3.4.
3. Until convergence or reaching the maximum number of iterations:
(a) Each agent internally uses messages in equations 3.11, 3.16 and 3.17 between
the variables and factors he is responsible for. Note that these messages are
only sent internally and no real communication between agents is needed.
(b) Each agent uses the message in equation 3.13 to communicate with each of
his potential partners.
4. The solution is determined as described in section 3.3.
3.6 Complexity Analysis
Along the analysis conducted in section 2.3.3 for lbp, in this section we provide worst-
case bounds on the amount of memory, the size of messages exchanged at each iteration,
and the computation time needed by rb-lbp agents. We assume that there are n agents,
the maximum number of goods that each agent is connected to is G, and the maximum
number of agents connected to a single good is A. According to this setting, an agent
can be linked to at most G ·A neighbours.
• Memory. Each rb-lbp agent needs to store a real number per variable in order
to maintain preferences over a variable’s states. Since each agent collaborates with
at most G · A other agents, the amount of memory to store his preferences is in
O(G ·A). Regarding factors, each rb-lbp agent only needs to store his activation
factor (it can avoid storing the constraint factors thanks to the equations obtained
in section 3.2.1). Hence, the memory that each rb-lbp agent needs is in O(G ·A).
Therefore, the requirements are:
• Communication. Note that each pair of agents involved in a potential collabo-
ration in rb-lbp are linked by a single equality constraint. Hence, they exchange
a single number. Since each agent collaborates with at most G ·A other agents his
communication requirements are in O(G·A). Thus, the total bandwidth consumed
by all rb-lbp agents is in O(n ·G ·A).
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• Computation time. At each iteration, each rb-lbp agent needs to assessO(G·A)
messages and by looking at the equations of the messages we see that each message
takes at most O(A) operations. Thus, the total computation time required by rb-
lbp agents is in O(G ·A2).
Table 3.1 compares the resouces needed by the lbp and rb-lbp algorithms, show-
ing that rb-lbp scales better in terms of memory, communication and computation
requirements.
Measure lbp rb-lbp
Memory needed per agent to store the preferences
over his state
O(AG) O(G ·A)
Size of largest factor O(A2G) O(1)
Maximum memory needed per agent (to store both
preferences and factors)
O(G ·A2G+1) O(G ·A)
Maximum message size O(AG) O(1)
Maximum bandwith consumed per agent O(G ·AG+1) O(G ·A)
Overall consumed bandwith O(n ·G ·AG+1) O(n ·G ·A)
Maximum computation time per agent and iteration O(G ·A2G+1) O(G ·A2)
Table 3.1: Required resources: LBP vs. RB-LBP.
3.7 Mechanism design properties
In order to have a better understanding of the behaviour of our method and how it
compares with methods described in chapter 2, we will devote the rest of this section to
analyze some of the game theoretic properties of our algorithm.
In order to discuss the mechanism design properties of rb-lbp first we need establish
how payments will be performed. Once the supply chain configuration has been assessed,
each producer receives a payment equal to his activation cost plus the activation costs
of the active producers for his inputs. This way, all producers receive a payment equal
to their activation cost plus a fixed margin encoded in their selling price. Consequently,
consumers may acquire goods for a price bellow their activation cost.
Individual rationality. By the mending process described in section 3.3 agents
ensure that they are either obtaining all their desired goods and selling them or inac-
tive. In none of these cases agents’ utility will be negative. Therefore, our method is
individualy rational.
Incentive compatibility. rb-lbp does not guarantee incentive compatibility. In
fact, agents can obtain higher utilities by misreporting their reserve prices. However,
there is a limit to this practice - an agent can be out of the supply chain by reporting
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a reserve price that is too high. This is common in real life markets where prices are
freely established.
Budget balance. According to the payment schema described above, our mech-
anism does not need any wages in or out the system. Therefore, rb-lbp is budget
balanced.
Allocative efficiency. Max-sum is known to converge to an optimal solution in tree-
structured graphs. However, there are no convergence guarantees for graphs containing
loops and the solution in these cases will be an approximation. Moreover, in graphs
with at most one loop, if convergence is reached, max-sum is known to find the optimal
solution[15]. rb-lbp is based on max-sum, therefore, it will achieve optimal allocations
for tree structured networks and only approximations for loopy networks.
In this chapter we have presented rb-lbp, our algorithm to solve the SCF problem
in a decentralized manner. Moreover, we have presented a complexity analysis that
shows that worst case memory and networks requirements are linear while worst case
computation time is polynomial. Finally, we have provided an analysis of some of the
mechanism design properties of our method.
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Chapter 4
Experimental results
In this chapter, we describe a series of experiments designed and performed in orded
to confirm the complexity analysis conducted in section 3.6. Firstly, we describe how
rb-lbp and lbp were implemented and which tools were used in the process. Secondly,
we detail how the experimental design. Finally, we describe the metrics that were used
to measure the performance of both methods and provide a thorough analysis of the
collected data.
4.1 Implementing decentralised supply chain formation al-
gorithms
The implementation of both lbp and rb-lbp was done as an extension of libDAI [9].
libDAI is an open source C++ library that implements various probabilistic inference
methods. Since max-sum is already implemented in libDAI and both lbp and rb-lbp
are based on it, libDAI was a perfect as a starting point for our implementation.
For the implementation of lbp most of the codebase of the original implementation
of max-sum in libDAI was left intact. On top of libDAI we implemented assessing
convergence of the algorithm (which differs slightly for the ones in libDAI) and the
post-convergence process for eliminating incompatibilities as described in section 2.3.3.
The implementation of rb-lbp was more challenging since rb-lbp is a specialization
of the standard max-sum. Our main modifications to libDAI were:
1. Factors as functions. One of the strengths of rb-lbp is that it does not need
tables to store its factor since they can be calculated from their inputs, saving
memory in the process. Therefore, our first change in the implementation was to
extends the factors in libDAI (which stored as tables) to allow such behaviour.
2. Reduced messages. The introduction of binary variables allows rb-lbp to
greatly simplify the calculation of the messages and the amount of information
exchanged between factors and variables. Therefore, we had to modify the logic
related to message calculation and message passing.
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3. Factors with preferences. The inclusion of preferences as tie-breaking mech-
anism in rb-lbp resulted in a slight modification of the implementation of the
factors in libDAI.
4.2 Experimental design
In this section we describe the design of the experiments conducted to evaluate the
performance of rb-lbp. In [16], Winsper and Chli evaluate their method in the TDN
described by Walsh and Wellman in [13]. These networks are relatively small (33 agents
at most) which makes them poor candidates to evaluate an algorithm’s scalability. How-
ever, these TDNs have been studied in detail by Winsper et al. in [16] and represent a
good reference point for a more detailed comparison of lbp and rb-lbp.
For these small TDNs we follow the same initialization procedure as described by
Walsh and Wellman in [13] and Winsper et al. in [16]. Selling prices for producers
are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution U(0,1). Moreover, buying prices for
consumers are fixed to the value that appears bellow each consumer in appendix A.
Consumer’s buying prices were calculated by Walsh and Wellman in [13] to ensure the
existence of a solution in which the consumer obtains benefit in 90% of the instances.
Our main concern is to evaluate how rb-lbp scales compared to lbp and wether the
complexity results anticipated in table 3.1 hold true or not. For that purpose, we need
bigger networks. In order to generate larger networks we resorted to the test-suite for
MMUCAs (MMUCATS) described in [12]. MMUCATS is specifically designed to mimic
real-world supply chain formation problems. We generate TDNs with 50 goods and a
number of agents ranging from 40 to 500. Since the number of goods is fixed across
scenarios, the degree of competition in the TDNs grows with the number of agents.
For each scenario, we generate 100 problems. We solve problems using the implemen-
tations for rb-lbp and lbp described above. Our tests are run on an Intel(R) Xeon(TM)
CPU running at 3.20GHz with 2GB of RAM on linux-2.6 x86 64. For each problem we
record the following values:
Maximum memory requirement. Measured as the maximum amount of memory
needed by any agent in the problem to store both his preferences and its factors.
Maximum bandwidth per agent. Measured by the maximum quantity trasmitted
and received by any agent in a iteration of the problem. Note that in lbp and rb-lbp
each agents has the same network usage in all the iterations of the algorithm.
Problem solving time. Time taken to solve the problem. This time includes the time
necessary for the post-processing of the allocations (sections 2.3.3 and 3.3) both for lbp
and rb-lbp.
Benefit over LBP. Calculated by dividing the value of the supply chain assessed by
rb-lbp by the value of the supply chain assessed by lbp. The values of the supply
chains are assessed using equation 2.1.
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4.3 Empirical evaluation
In this section we analyze the results obtained after evaluating separately TDNs from
[13] and larger networks with higher degrees of competition generated with MMU-
CATS. Hardness in the problems we generated using MMUCATS presented high vari-
ability. Therefore, the distribution of the results we obtained was long-tailed and non-
symmetrical.
In order to improve readability of the plots and maintain consistency in how results
are reported, we use median values instead of mean values both for Walsh and Wellman’s
TDNs and large-scale network structures. Moreover, for those plots where the difference
in performance between rb-lbp and lbp was large, plots are provided both in logarithmic
and linear scale.
4.3.1 Small network structures
In this section we turn our attention to the network structures from [13]. Figure 4.1a
shows that lbp requires from 2 up to 13 times more memory than rb-lbp depending on
the TDN structure. This difference is specially large for bigger and unbalanced networks
that represent markets with higher competition. Figure 4.1b shows that the maximum
bandwidth consumed by an agent during an lbp iteration is up to 5 times larger than
rb-lbp’s. Again, the difference is more obvius for bigger and unbalanced networks since
network usage and memory requirements are tightly coupled in lbp.
(a) Maximum memory requirement. (b) Maximum bandwidth per agent.
Figure 4.1: RB-LBP vs LBP in Walsh’s TDNs.
The values of the supply chain configurations obtained by our implementation of lbp
match the results reported in [16]. rb-lbp’s average supply chain values are identical
to lbp’s. Due to the small size of the networks both lbp and rb-lbp converge to a
supply chain configuration in the order of the millisecond, being negligible the difference
between both methods.
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4.3.2 Large network structures
In this section we focus on the scalability of rb-lbp and lbp. Specifically, we check
wether the complexity results anticipated in table 3.1 hold true or not. In sections 2.3.3
and 3.3 we mention that lbp and rb-lbp are not guaranteed to converge and that,
if convergence is not reached, both methods halt after a certain number of iterations.
Contrarily to what happened in the previous section, problems with high degrees of
competition did not always converge. Therefore, in our experiments, problems run un-
til convergence or for a maximum of 250 iterations. Moreover, due to computational
constraints, TDNs in which the memory requirements for an agent exceed 100MB or
the memory needed by the whole network exceeded 1GB were discarded. Note that,
since rb-lbp agents have much lower memory requirements than lbp agents, we only
encountered such cases for lbp agents.
Figure 4.2 shows the medians over 100 runs of the maximum memory required per
agent for both rb-lbp and lbp. Observe that lbp’s memory requirements grow expo-
nentially with the number of agents while memory requirements for rb-lbp grow linearly.
Moreover, for networks with higher degrees of competition, the memory requirements
for lbp are up to 5 orders of magnitude (105 times) greater than for rb-lbp.
Figure 4.2: Maximum memory requirement.
Figure 4.3 shows the median value of the maximum bandwidth required per agent
during one iteration for both rb-lbp and lbp. In this case, bandwidth usage, also
displays an exponential growth for lbp while it is lineal for rb-lbp. Bandwidth usage
for lbp is up to 787 times greater than for rb-lbp.
Figure 4.4 shows the median value of the time required for rb-lbp and lbp to provide
a solution for the problems. In this case, the exponential behaviour of lbp is confirmed
as well as the polynomial behaviour of rb-lbp. Moreover, rb-lbp is up to 20 times
faster than lbp for the problems tested.
Finally, it is worth noting that none of those benefits come at the expense of the
quality of the solution. Moreover, figure 4.5 shows that the value of the supply chain
configurations obtained by rb-lbp is almost never smaller and eventually more than 2
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Figure 4.3: Maximum bandwidth per agent.
Figure 4.4: Median problem solving time.
times larger than those obtained by lbp.
In this chapter we have conducted experiments specifically designed to evaluate the
scalability of rb-lbp. Results confirm the theoretical behaviour given in section 3.6.
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Figure 4.5: RB-LBP benefit over LBP.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Production paradigms are shifting from monolithic enterprises controlling every step of
the production process towards a distributed model where companies swiftly establish
short terms commercial relationships. In such scenarios, having tools that allow to
evaluate which collaborations are beneficial and which are not is key to the success of a
company. In chapter 2 we have described several state of the art approaches to solve the
problem of the supply chain formation. Moreover, we have argued that most of them
suffer from lack of scalability or privacy.
In chapter 3 we have described rb-lbp, a novel approach for decentralized SCF.
rb-lbp casts the SCF problem to a binary factor graph that can be approximated using
max-sum. We have shown theoretically and experimentally that rb-lbp scales nicely to
market scenarios with larger number of participants and increasing competition. Our
experimental results show that rb-lbp can significantly reduce the usage of memory and
communication several orders of magnitude with respect to lbp. Furthermore, rb-lbp
produces up to two times higher value supply chains and has smaller time complexity.
Therefore, rb-lbp allows to tackle large-scale decentralized SCF problems.
Up to date approaches for decentralized SCF [13, 16] can only be applied to task
dependency networks where agents can produce at most a single good. In order to com-
pare with previously existing approaches, all the experimental results in this paper are
over task dependency networks. However, rb-lbp can readily be applied to scenarios
where producers can deliver more than one good. Experimentally evaluating rb-lbp in
these scenarios and over a variety of actual-world network structures is left as future
work. Furthermore, game theoretic properties discussed in section 3.7 depend greatly
in the pricing policies being enforced. Therefore, remain as future work to study in
detail how changes in the pricing policies affect the behaviour of the agents. Specifically,
it can be interesting to find if there exists such policy that ensures incentive compatibility.
40
This thesis has resulted in the following publication:
Toni Penya-Alba, Meritxell Vinyals, Jesus Cerquides and Juan A. Rodriguez-
Aguilar. Scalable decentralized supply chain formation thorugh binarized
belief propagation. In -Proceedings of the 11th Int. Conf. on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS forthcoming 2012).
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Appendix A
Walsh and Wellman’s TDNs
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Figure A.1: Network BIGGER.
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Figure A.2: Network GREEDY-BAD.
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Figure A.3: Network MANY-CONS.
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Figure A.4: Network SIMPLE.
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Figure A.5: Network TWO-CONS.
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Figure A.6: Network UNBALANCED.
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